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Abstract
We revisit a classical problem in transportation, known as the continuous (bilevel) network design
problem, CNDP for short. We are given a graph for which the latency of each edge depends on the ratio
of the edge flow and the capacity installed. The goal is to find an optimal investment in edge capacities
so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost of the induced Wardrop equilibrium and the investment
cost for installing the capacity. While this problem is considered as challenging in the literature, its
complexity status was still unknown. We close this gap showing that CNDP is strongly NP-complete
and APX-hard, both on directed and undirected networks and even for instances with affine latencies.
As for the approximation of the problem, we first provide a detailed analysis for a heuristic studied
by Marcotte for the special case of monomial latency functions (Mathematical Programming, Vol. 34,
1986). Specifically, we derive a closed form expression of its approximation guarantee for arbitrary sets
S of allowed latency functions. Second, we propose a different approximation algorithm and show that it
has the same approximation guarantee. As our arguably most interesting result regarding approximation,
we show that using the better of the two approximation algorithms results in a strictly improved approx-
imation guarantee for which we give a closed form expression. For affine latencies, e.g., this algorithm
achieves a 49/41 ≈ 1.195-approximation which improves on the 5/4 that has been shown before by
Marcotte. We finally discuss the case of hard budget constraints on the capacity investment.
Keywords: Bilevel optimization, Optimization under equilibrium constraints, Network design,
Wardrop equilibrium, Computational complexity, Approximation algorithms
1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal works of Pigou [24] and Wardrop [32], the impact of selfish behavior in congested
transportation networks has been investigated intensively over the past decades. In Wardrop’s basic model of
traffic flows, the interaction between the selfish network users is modeled as a non-cooperative game. This
game takes place in a directed graph with latency functions on the edges and a set of origin-destination pairs,
called commodities. Every commodity has a demand associated with it, which specifies the amount of flow
that needs to be sent from the respective origin to the respective destination. It is assumed that every demand
represents a large population of players, each controlling an infinitesimal small amount of flow, thus, having
a negligible impact on the latencies of others. The latency that a player experiences when traversing an
edge is determined by a non-decreasing latency function of the edge flow on that edge. In practice, latency
functions are calibrated to reflect edge specific parameters such as street length and capacity. One of the
most prominent and popular functions used in actual traffic models are the ones put forward by the Bureau
of Public Roads (BPR) [30]. BPR-type latency functions are of the form Se(ve) = te ·
(
1 + be · (ve/ze)4
)
,
where ve is the edge flow, te represents the free-flow travel time, be > 0 is an edge-specific bias, and ze
represents the street capacity. In a Wardrop equilibrium (also called Wardop flow), every player chooses a
minimum-latency path from its origin to the destination; under mild assumptions on the latency functions
this corresponds to a Nash equilibrium for an associated non-cooperative game [3].
It is well known that Wardrop equilibria can be inefficient in the sense that they do not minimize the
total travel time in the network [13]. Prominent examples of this inefficiency include the famous Braess
Paradox [7], where improving the network infrastructure by adding street capacity may result in a Wardrop
equilibrium with strictly higher total travel time. This at the first sight surprising non-monotonic behavior
of selfish flows illustrates that designing networks for good traffic equilibria is an important and non-trivial
issue.
In this paper, we revisit one of the most classical network design problems, termed the continuous
(bilevel) network design problem, CNDP for short, which has been introduced by Dafermos [10], Dantzig
et al. [12], and Abdulaal et al. [1], and was later studied by Marcotte [22]. In this problem, we are given
a graph for which the latency of each edge depends on the ratio of the edge flow and the capacity installed
and the goal is to find an optimal investment in edge capacities so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost
of the induced Wardrop equilibrium and the investment cost. From a mathematical perspective, CNDP is a
bilevel optimization problem (cf. [8, 20] for an overview), where in the upper level the edge capacities are
determined and, given these capacities, in the lower level the flow will settle into a Wardrop equilibrium.
Clearly, the lower level reaction depends on the first level decision because altering the capacity investment
on a subset of edges may result in revised route choices by users.
CNDP has been intensively studied since the late sixties (cf. [10, 21]) and several heuristic approaches
have been proposed since then; see Yang et al. [33] for a comprehensive survey. Most of the proposed
heuristics are numerical in nature and involve iterative computations of relaxations of the problem (for
instance the iterative optimization and assignment algorithm as described in [23] and augmented Lagrangian
methods or linearizations of the objective in the leader and follower problem). An exception is the work
of Marcotte [22] who considered several algorithms based on solutions of associated convex optimization
problems which can be solved in polynomial time [15]. He derives worst-case bounds for his heuristics
and, in particular, for affine latency functions he devises an approximation algorithm with an approximation
factor of 5/4. For general monomial latency functions plus a constant (including the latency functions used
by the Bureau of Public Roads [30]) he obtains a polynomial time 2-approximation.
Variants of CNDP have also been considered in the networking literature, see [16, 17, 18, 6]. These
works, however, consider the case where a budget capacity must be distributed among a set of edges to
improve the resulting equilibrium. Most results, however, only work for simplified network topologies (e.g.,
parallel links) or special latency functions (e.g., M/M/1 latency functions).
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Our Results and Used Techniques. Despite more than forty years of research, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the computational complexity status of CNDP is still unknown. We close this gap as we show that
CNDP is strongly NP-complete and APX-hard, both on directed and undirected networks and even for in-
stances with affine latencies of the form Se(ve/ze) = αe + βe · (ve/ze), αe, βe ≥ 0. For the proof of
the NP-hardness, we reduce from 3-SAT. The reduction has the property that in case that the underlying
instance of 3-SAT has a solution the cost of an optimal solution is equal to the minimal cost of a relaxation
of the problem, in which the equilibrium conditions are relaxed. The key challenge of the hardness proof
is to obtain a lower bound on the optimal solution when the underlying 3-SAT instance has no solution.
Our main idea is to relax the equilibrium conditions only partially which enables us to bound the cost of an
optimal solution from below by solving an associated constrained quadratic optimization problem. With a
more involved construction and a more detailed analysis, we can even prove APX-hardness of the problem.
Here, we reduce from a symmetric variant of MAX-3-SAT, in which all literals occur exactly twice. While
all our hardness proofs rely on instances with an arbitrary number of commodities and respective sinks, we
show that for instances in which all commodities share a common sink, CNDP can be solved to optimality
in polynomial time.
In light of the hardness of CNDP, we focus on approximation algorithms. We first consider a polyno-
mial time algorithm proposed by Marcotte [22]. This algorithm, which we call BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM,
first computes a relaxation of CNDP by removing the equilibrium conditions. Then, it reduces the edge
capacities individually such that the flow computed in the relaxation becomes a Wardrop equilibrium.
We give a closed form expression of the performance of this algorithm with respect to the set S of al-
lowed latency functions. Specifically, we show that this algorithm is a (1 + µ(S))-approximation, where
µ(S) = supS∈S supx≥0maxγ∈[0,1] γ ·
(
1−S(γ x)/S(x)). The value µ(S) has been used before by Correa et
al. [9] and Roughgarden [29] in the context of price of anarchy bounds for selfish routing where they showed
that the routing cost of a Wardrop equilibrium is no more than a factor of 1/(1 − µ(S)) away of the cost of
a system optimum. For the special case that S is the set of polynomials with non-negative coefficients and
maximal degree ∆, we derive exactly the approximation guarantees that Marcotte obtained for monomials.
As an outcome of our more general analysis, we further derive that this algorithm is a 2-approximation for
general convex latency functions and a 5/4-approximation for concave latency functions.
We then propose a new algorithm which we call SCALEUNIFORMLY. This algorithm first computes
an optimal solution of the relaxation (as before) and then uniformly scales the capacities with a certain
parameter λ(S) that depends on the class of allowable latency functions S . Based on well-known techniques
using variational inequalities (Correa et al. [9] and Roughgarden [29]), we prove that this algorithm also
yields a (1 + µ(S))-approximation. As our main result regarding approximation algorithms, we show that
using the better of the two solutions returned by BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM and SCALEUNIFORMLY yields
strictly better approximation guarantees. We give a closed form expression for the new approximation
guarantee (as a function of S) that, perhaps interestingly, depends not only on the well-known value µ(S)
but also on the argument maximum γ(S) in the definition of µ(S). We demonstrate the applicability of this
general bound by showing that it achieves a 9/5-approximation for S containing arbitrary convex latencies.
For affine latencies it achieves a 49/41 ≈ 1.195-approximation improving on the 5/4 of Marcotte. An
overview of our results compared to those of Marcotte can be found in Table 1 in the appendix.
In the final section we consider the case of arbitrary convex constraints on the capacity variables that
includes global as well as individual budget constraints on edges. We show that solving the relaxed problem
with removed equilibrium constraints achieves a trivial approximation ratio of 1/(1−µ(S)) using the well-
known price of anarchy results. For affine latencies, however, we show that this is essentially best possible
by giving a corresponding hardness result. All proof missing in this extended abstract can be found in the
appendix.
2
Further Application. Our results have impact beyond the classical application of designing street ca-
pacities of road networks. In the telecommunications networking literature, Wardrop equilibria appear in
networks with source-routing, where it is assumed that end-users choose least-delay paths knowing the state
of all available paths. As outlined in [31], Wardrop equilibria arise even in networks with distributed delay-
based routing protocols such as OSPF using delay for setting the routing weights. In telecommunication
networks, the latency at switches and routers depends on the installed capacity and has been modeled by
BPR-type functions of the form Se(ve/ze) = ρ (1 + 0.15 (ve/ze))4, where ρ represents the propagation
delay and ze the installed capacity [25]. These functions fit into our framework, and our analysis improves
the state-of-the-art to a 1.418-approximation. Additionally, our 9/5-approximation applies to Davidson la-
tency functions of the form Se(veze ) =
ve
ze
/(1 − veze ) = ve/(ze − ve), where ze represents the capacity of
edge e. These functions behave quite similar to the frequently used M/M/1-delay functions of the form
Se(ve) = 1/(ze − ve), cf. [16, 27].
Further Related Work. Quoting [33], CNDP has been recognized to be “one of the most difficult and
challenging problems in transport” and there are numerous works approaching this problem. In light of the
substantial literature on heuristics for CNDP, we refer the reader to the survey papers [8, 14, 21, 33].
While to the best of our knowledge prior to this work, the complexity status of CNDP was open, there
have been several papers on the complexity of the discrete (bilevel) network design problem, DNDP for
short, see [19, 26]. Given a network with edge latency functions and traffic demands, a basic variant of
DNDP is to decide which edges should be removed from the network to obtain a Wardrop equilibrium
in the resulting sub-network with minimum total travel time. This variant is motivated by the classical
Braess paradox, where removing an edge from the network may improve the travel time of the new Wardrop
equilibrium. Roughgarden [26] showed that DNDP is strongly NP-hard and that there is no (⌊n/2⌋ − ǫ)-
approximation algorithm (unless P = NP), even for single-commodity instances. He further showed that
for single-commodity instances the trivial algorithm of not removing any edge from the graph is essentially
best possible and achieves a ⌊n/2⌋-approximation. For affine latency functions, the trivial algorithm gives
a 4/3-approximation (even for general networks) and this is also shown to be best possible. These results in
comparison to ours highlight interesting differences. While DNDP is not approximable by any constant for
convex latencies, for CNDP we give a 9/5-approximation. Moreover, all hardness results for DNDP already
hold for single-commodity instances, while for CDNP we show that this case is solvable in polynomial time.
Bhaskar et al. [6] studied a variant of CNDP where initial edge capacities are given and additional
budget must be distributed among the edges to improve the resulting equilibrium. Among other results they
show that the problem is NP-complete in single-commodity networks that consist of parallel links in series.
This again stands in contrast to our polynomial-time algorithm for CDNP for these instances.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be a directed or undirected graph, V its set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V its set of edges. We
are given a set K of commodities, where each commodity k is associated with a triple (sk, tk, dk) ∈ V ×V ×
R>0, where sk ∈ V is the source, tk ∈ V the sink and dk the demand of commodity k. A multi-commodity
flow on G is a collection of non-negative flow vectors (vk)k∈K such that for each k ∈ K the flow vector
v
k = (vke )e∈E satisfies the flow conservation constraints
∑
u∈V :(u,w)∈E v
k
(u,w) −
∑
u∈V :(w,u)∈E v
k
(w,u) = 0
for all w ∈ V \ {sk, tk} and
∑
u∈V :(sk,u)∈E
vksk,u =
∑
u∈V :(u,tk)∈E
vku,tk = dk. Whenever we write v
without a superscript k for the commodity, we implicitly sum over all commodities, i.e., ve =
∑
k∈K v
k
e and
v = (ve)e∈E . We call ve an edge flow. The set of all feasible edge flows will be denoted by F .
The latency of each edge e depends on the installed capacity ze ≥ 0 and the edge flow ve on e, and is
given by a latency function Se : R≥0 → R≥0 ∪ {∞} that maps ve/ze to a latency value Se(ve/ze), where
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we use the convention that Se(ve/ze) =∞ whenever ze = 0. Throughout this paper, we assume that the set
of allowable latency functions is restricted to some set S and we impose the following assumptions on S .
Assumption 2.1. The set S of allowable latency functions only contains continuously differentiable and
semi-convex functions S such that the functions x 7→ S(x) and x 7→ x2S′(x) are strictly increasing and
unbounded.
Assumption 2.1 is is slightly more general than requiring that all latency functions are stricly increasing
and convex. For instance, the function S(x) :=
√
x satisfies Assumption 2.1 although it is concave.
Given a vector of capacities z = (ze)e∈E , the latency of each edge e solely depends on the edge flow ve.
Under these conditions, there exists a Wardrop flow v = (ve)e∈E , i.e., a flow in which each commodity only
uses paths of minimal latency. It is well known (see e.g. [3, 11, 28]) that each Wardrop flow is a solution to
the optimization problem minv∈F
∑
e∈E
∫ ve
0 Se(t/ze) dt, and satisfies the variational inequality∑
e∈E
S(ve/ze)(ve − v′e) ≤ 0 (2.1)
for every feasible flow v′ ∈ F . For a vector of capacities z we denote by W(z) the corresponding set of
Wardrop flows v(z). Beckmann et al. [3] showed that Wardrop flows and optimum flows are related:
Proposition 2.2 (Beckmann et al. [3]). Denote by S∗e (x) = (xSe(x))′ = Se(x) + xS′e(x) the marginal cost
function of edge e ∈ E. Then v∗ is an optimum flow with respect to the latency functions (Se)e∈E if and
only if it is Wardrop flow with respect to (S∗e )e∈E .
In the continuous (bilevel) network design problem (CNDP) the goal is to buy capacities ze at a price
per unit ℓe > 0 so as to minimize the sum of the construction cost CZ(v,z) =
∑
e∈E ze ℓe and the routing
cost CR(v,z) =
∑
e∈E Se(ve/ze) ve of a resulting Wardrop equilibrium v. Observe that CR(v,z) is well
defined as, by (2.1), it is the same for all Wardrop equilibria with respect to z. Denote the combined cost by
C(v,z) = CR(v,z) + CZ(v,z).
Definition 2.3 (Continuous network design problem (CNDP)). Given a directed graph G = (V,E) and for
each edge e a latency function Se and a construction cost ℓe > 0, the continuous network design problem
(CNDP) is to determine a non-negative capacity vector z = (ze)e∈E that minimizes
min
z≥0
min
v∈W(z)
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ve/ze) ve + ze ℓe
)
. (CNDP)
Relaxing the condition that v is a Wardrop equilibrium in (CNDP), we obtain the following relaxation
of the continuous network design problem:
min
z≥0
min
v∈F
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ve/ze) ve + ze ℓe
)
. (CNDP’)
Marcotte [22] showed that for convex and unbounded latency functions, the relaxed problem (CNDP’)
can be solved efficiently by performing |K| independent shortest path computations on the graph G, one
for each commodity k ∈ K . The following proposition slightly generalizes his result to arbitrary, not
necessarily convex latency functions that satisfy Assumption 2.1.
Proposition 2.4 (Marcotte [22]). The relaxation (CNDP’) can be solved by performing |K| shortest path
computation problems in polynomial time.
Remark 2.5. To speak about polynomial algorithms and hardness, we need to specify how the instances
of CNDP, in particular the latency functions, are encoded, cf. [2, 15, 26]. While our hardness results hold
even if all functions are linear and given by their rational coefficients, for our approximation algorithms, we
require that we can solve (symbolically) equations involving a latency function and its derivative, e.g., Equa-
tion (4.4). Without this assumption, we still obtain the claimed approximation guarantees within arbitrary
precision by polynomial time algorithms.
4
3 Hardness
As the main result of this section, we show that CNDP is APX-hard both on directed and undirected networks
and even for affine latency functions. The proof of this result is technically quite involved, and we first show
the weaker result that CNDP on directed networks is NP-complete. Due to space constraints, we here only
sketch the proof of the NP-completeness for directed networks and the case that there are edges with zero
latency. For the full proof and the discussion that the problem remains hard, even if no edges with zero
latency are allowed, we refer to the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. The continuous network design problem on directed networks is NP-complete in the strong
sense, even if all latency functions are affine.
Sketch of proof. We reduce from 3-SAT. Let a Boolean formula φ in conjunctive normal form be given
and for κ, ν ∈ N, let K(φ) = {1, 2, . . . , κ} and V (φ) = {x1, x2, . . . , xν} denote the set of its clauses
and variables, respectively. For each variable xi ∈ V (φ), we introduce a variable commodity jxi with unit
demand, and for each clause k ∈ K(φ) we introduce a clause commodity jk with unit demand. For each
literal l and each clause k, there is a literal edge el,k with latency function Sel,k(vel,k , zel,k) = vel,k/zel,k and
construction cost ℓel,k = 1. Further, for some ǫ > 0 and for each clause k, there is a clause edge ek with
Sek(vek/zek) = 4 + vek/zek and construction cost ℓek = (ǫ/2)2. Every variable commodity jxi has two
feasible paths, one consist of the literal edges {exi,k : k ∈ K(φ)} corresponding to the positive literal xi,
the other one consists of the literal edges {ex¯i,k : k ∈ K(φ)} corresponding to the negative literal x¯i. In that
way, each route choice of the variable commodities corresponds to a fractional assignment of the variables.
For each clause k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k , the clause commodity jk has two feasible paths as well, one consists of the
clause edge ek, the other one contains the three literal edges elk,k, el′k,k, and el′′k ,k. We add some additional
edges with zero latency to this path in order to obtain a network structure, see Figure 1 in the appendix.
Let us first assume that φ has a solution y = (yxi)xi∈V (φ) and let y¯ = (y¯xi)xi∈V (φ) be the negation of y.
Then, an optimal solution to the so-defined instance of CNDP is follows. For each variable commodity jxi ,
we buy capacity 1 on the path consisting of the edges {ey¯xi ,k : k ∈ K(φ)} and we route the unit demand of
variable commodity jxi over the edges of that path. For each clause commodity jk, we route the unit demand
over the clause edge ek. Using that y is a solution of φ, we derive that for each clause, there is a literal l∗k
that occurs in y, and thus, l∗k does not occur in y¯. However, this implies that for each clause k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k ,
at least one of the three literal edges elk ,k, el′k ,k, and el′′k ,k has capacity 0 and, thus, infinite latency. Thus,
the clause commodity jk has only one path with finite length and we conclude that the so-defined flow is a
Wardrop equilibrium. This solution has total cost 2κν + (4 + ǫ)κ which can be shown to be minimal as it
coincides with the total cost of the relaxation of the problem without the equilibrium constraints.
If φ does not admit a solution, we show that each feasible solution has cost strictly larger than 2κν +
(4+ ǫ)κ. Assume by contradiction that there is a solution (v,z) with cost at most 2κν+(4+ ǫ)κ. We claim
that in v, each clause commodity ek uses its clause edge, i.e., vek > 0. To see this, note that each unit of
flow of the clause commodities that is routed over the three corresponding literal edges contributes at least
6 to the total cost of a solution while each unit of flow that is routed over a clause edge contributes at most
(4+ǫ) to the total cost. This implies, that the total cost is at least 2κν+(4+ǫ)κ+(2−ǫ) if one of the clause
commodities does not use its clause edge. However, since φ does not admit a solution, we cannot prevent
a clause commodity from using three of the corresponding literal edges without reducing the capacity on at
least one of these edges below 1. Reducing the capacity on the literal edges below 1, however, comes at a
cost, since the resulting capacities are then strictly smaller than in the relaxation of the problem. By solving
an associated constrained quadratic program, we show that the total cost of any feasible solution is at least
2κν + (4 + ǫ)κ+ 1/8, if φ does not admit a solution.
With a more involved construction and a more detailed analysis, we can show that CNDP is in fact
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APX-hard. For this proof, we use a similar construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. However, instead
from 3-SAT, we reduce from a specific variant of MAX-3-SAT, which is NP-hard to approximate.
Theorem 3.2. The continuous network design problem on directed networks is APX-hard, even if all latency
function are affine.
With a similar construction, we can also show APX-hardness for CNDP on undirected networks as well,
see Theorem A.2 in the appendix. For our hardness results, we use instances with different sinks. In contrast,
CNDP can be solved efficiently for networks with a single sink.
Proposition 3.3. In networks with only one sink vertex t, the continuous network design problem can be
solved in polynomial time.
4 Approximation
Given the APX-hardness of the problem, we study the approximation of CNDP. We first provide a detailed
analysis of the approximation guarantees of two different approximation algorithms. Then, as the arguably
most interesting result of this section, we provide an improved approximation guarantee for taking the
better of the two algorithms. The approximation guarantees proven in this section depend on the set S
of allowable cost functions and are in fact closely related to the anarchy value value α(S) introduced by
Roughgarden [29] and Correa et al. [9]. Intuitively, the anarchy value of a set of latency functions S is the
worst case ratio between the routing cost of a Wardrop equilibrium and that of a system optimum of an
instance in which all latency functions are contained in S . Roughgarden [29] and Correa et al. [9] show that
α(S) = 1/(1 − µ(S)), where
µ(S) = sup
S∈S
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ ·
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
. (4.1)
For a set S of latency functions, we denote by γ(S) the argmaximum γ in (4.1) for which µ(S) is achieved.
The following lemma gives an alternative representation of µ(S) that will be useful in the remainder of this
section.
Lemma 4.1. For a latency function S,
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
{
γ
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)}
= sup
x≥0
{
γ · S
′(x)x
S(x) + S′(x)x
: S(x) + S′(x)x = S(x/γ)
}
.
4.1 Two Approximation Algorithms
The first algorithm that we call BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM (cf. Algorithm 1) was already proposed by Mar-
cotte [22, Section 4.3] and analyzed for monomial latency functions. Our contribution is a more general
analysis of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM that works for arbitrary sets of latency functions S , requiring only As-
sumption 2.1. The second algorithm, that we call SCALEUNIFORMLY (cf. Algorithm 2), is a new algorithm
that we introduce in this paper.
For both approximation algorithms, we first compute an optimum solution (v∗,z∗) to a relaxation of
CNDP without the equilibrium constraints, i.e., we compute a solution (v∗,z∗) to the problem
minz≥0minv∈F
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ve/ze) ve + ze ℓe
)
, which can be done in polynomial time (Proposition 2.4).
Then, in both algorithms, we reduce the capacity vector z∗, and determine a Wardrop equilibrium for the
new capacity vector. The algorithms differ in the way we adjust the capacity vector z∗. While in BRINGTO-
EQUILIBRIUM, we reduce the edge capacities individually such that the optimum solution to the relaxation
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Algorithm 1 BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM
1: (v∗,z∗)← solution to relaxation (CNDP’).
2: for all e ∈ E do
3: δe ← v∗e/z∗e
4: γe ← solution to Se(δe)+S′e(δe)δe = Se( δeγe )
5: ze ← γez∗e
6: end for
7: return (v∗,z)
Algorithm 2 SCALEUNIFORMLY
1: (v∗,z∗)← solution to relaxation (CNDP’).
2: p← CR(v∗,z∗)/C(v∗,z∗)
3: λ← µ(S) +
√
µ(S) p1−p
4: Compute Wardrop equilibrium v
with respect to scaled capacities λz∗.
5: return (v, λz∗)
(CNDP’) is a Wardrop equilibrium, in SCALEUNIFORMLY, we scale all capacities uniformly by a factor λ
(cf. line 2-3) and compute a Wardrop equilibrium for the scaled capacities.
We first show that the approximation guarantee of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM is at most (1 + µ(S)). For
the proof of this result, we use the first order optimality conditions for the vector of capacities v∗ obtained as
a solution to the relaxed problem (CNDP’) in combination with the variational inequalities technique used
in the price of anarchy literature (e.g. Roughgarden [29] and Correa et al. [9]).
Theorem 4.2. The approximation guarantee of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM is at most (1 + µ(S)).
Proof. Let (v∗,z∗) be the relaxed solution computed in the first step of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM. By the
necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, (v∗,z∗) satisfies
ℓe = S
′
e(v
∗
e/z
∗
e)(v
∗
e/z
∗
e)
2, for all e ∈ E with z∗e > 0 . (4.2)
Eliminating ℓe in the statement of the relaxed problem (CNDP’) we obtain the following expression for the
total cost of the relaxation:
C(v∗, z∗) =
∑
e∈E
(
Se(v
∗
e/z
∗
e) + S
′
e(v
∗
e/z
∗
e)(v
∗
e/z
∗
e)
)
v∗e . (4.3)
For each e ∈ E let δe = v∗e/z∗e , if z∗e > 0, and δe = 0, otherwise. We define a new vector of capacities z by
ze = γe · z∗e , e ∈ E, where γe ∈ [0, 1] is a solution to the equation
Se(δe) + S
′
e(δe) δe = Se(δe/γe). (4.4)
By Proposition 2.2, the flow v∗ is a Wardrop flow with respect to z. We are interested in bounding C(v∗,z).
To this end, we calculate
C(v∗, z) =
∑
e∈E
(Se(δe/γe)v
∗
e + ℓe ze)
(4.4)
=
∑
e∈E
((
Se(δe) + S
′
e(δe) δe
)
v∗e + γe ℓe z
∗
e
)
(4.2)
=
∑
e∈E
((
Se(δe) + S
′
e(δe) δe
)
v∗e + γe S
′
e(δe) δe v
∗
e
)
. (4.5)
By (4.1),(4.4), and Lemma 4.1, we have γe S′e(δe) δe ≤ µ(S) (Se(δe) + S′e(δe) δe). Combining this inequal-
ity with (4.5), gives
C(v∗, z) ≤ (1 + µ(S))
∑
e∈E
((
Se(δe) + S
′
e(δe) δe
)
v∗e
(4.3)
= (1 + µ(S))C(v∗, z∗).
We proceed by showing that SCALEUNIFORMLY achieves the same approximation guarantee of 1 +
µ(S). Recall that SCALEUNIFORMLY first computes a relaxed solution (v∗, z∗). Then, this relaxed solution
is used to compute an optimal scaling factor λ ≤ 1 with which all capacities are scaled subsequently.
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The algorithm then returns the scaled capacity vector λz∗ together with a correspond Wardrop equilibrium
v ∈ W(λz∗).
An (worse) approximation guarantee of 2 can be infered directly from a bicriteria result of Roughgarden
and Tardos [27] who showed that for any instance the routing cost of a Wardrop equilibrium is not worse
than a system optimum that ships twice as much flow. This implies that for λ = 1/2 we have C(v, λz∗) ≤
2C(v∗, z∗), as claimed.
For the proof of the following result, we take a different road that allows us to express the approximation
guarantee of SCALEUNIFORMLY as a function of the parameter p defined as the fraction of the total cost
C(v∗,z∗) of the relaxed solution allotted to the routing costs CR(v∗,z∗). This is an important ingredient
for the analysis of the best-of-two algorithm.
Theorem 4.3. The approximation guarantee of SCALEUNIFORMLY is at most (1 + µ(S)).
Proof. The algorithm first computes an optimum solution (v∗,z∗) of the relaxed problem (CNDP’). Then
p ∈ [0, 1] is defined as the fraction of C(v∗,z∗) that corresponds to the routing cost CR(v∗,z∗), i.e.,
CR(v∗,z∗) =
∑
e∈E Se(v
∗
e/z
∗
e ) v
∗
e = pC(v
∗,z∗). Now, we define λ = µ(S) +
√
µ(S) p1−p and consider
the capacity vector λz∗, in which the capacities of the optimal solution to the relaxation are scaled uniformly
by λ. Finally, we compute a Wardrop equilibrium with respect to capacities λz∗. Let v the corresponding
equilibrium flow. We now bound the routing and installation cost of (v, λz∗) separately. For the installation
cost, we obtain
CZ(v, λz∗) =
∑
e∈E
λ ℓe ze = λ(1 − p)C(v∗, z)
and for the routing cost
CR(v, λz∗) =
∑
e∈E
Se
( ve
λz∗e
)
ve ≤
∑
e∈E
Se
( ve
λz∗e
)
v∗e = pC(v
∗, z∗) +
∑
e∈E
(
Se
( ve
λz∗e
)
v∗e − Se
(v∗e
z∗e
)
v∗e
)
, (4.6)
where the first inequality uses the variational inequality (2.1). We proceed to bound Se( veλz∗e ) v
∗
e −Se(v
∗
e
z∗e
) v∗e
in terms of the routing cost Se( veλz∗e ) ve for that edge e. To this end, note that for each edge e ∈ E we have
Se(
ve
λz∗e
)v∗e − Se
( v∗e
z∗e
)
v∗e
Se(
ve
λz∗e
)ve
≤ sup
S∈S
sup
x,y,z≥0
S( yλz )x− S(xz )x
S( yλz )y
= sup
S∈S
sup
x,y≥0
S( yλ)x− S(x)x
S( yλ)y
= sup
S∈S
sup
x,y≥0
S(y)x− S(x)x
S(y)λy
.
This implies y ≥ x and we may substitute x = γ y with γ ∈ [0, 1]. We then obtain for each edge e ∈ E that
Se(
ve
λz∗e
)v∗e − Se
( v∗e
z∗e
)
v∗e
Se(
ve
λz∗e
)ve
≤ sup
S∈S
sup
y≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γS(y)− γS(γ y)
λS(y)
= sup
S∈S
sup
y≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
λ
(
1− S(γ y)
S(y)
)
=
µ(S)
λ
. (4.7)
Plugging (4.7) in (4.6), we obtain for the routing cost CR(v, λz∗) ≤ pC(v∗,z∗) + µ(S)λ CR(v, λz∗) or,
equivalently, CR(v, λz∗) ≤ p1−µ(S)/λC(v∗,z∗). Thus, we can bound the total cost of the outcome of
SCALEUNIFORMLY by
C(v, λz∗) = CR(v, λz∗) + CZ(v, λz∗) ≤ p
1− µ(S)/λC(v
∗, z∗) + λ(1 − p)C(v∗, z∗)
= λ
( p
λ− µ(S) + 1− p
)
C(v∗, z∗).
Since λ = µ(S) +
√
µ(S) p1−p , we obtain
C(v, λz∗)
C(v∗, z∗)
≤ p+ 2
√
p(1− p)µ(S) + µ(S)(1 − p) = (√p+√µ(S)(1 − p))2. (4.8)
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Elementary calculus shows that
(√
p +
√
µ(S)(1− p))2 attains its maximum at p = 11+µ(S) . Substituting
this value into (4.8) gives C(v, λz∗)/C(v∗,z∗) ≤ 1 + µ(S), as claimed.
For particular sets S of latency functions, we compute upper bounds upper bounds on µ(S) in order to
obtain an explicit upper bound on the approximation guarantees of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM and SCALE-
UNIFORMLY. We then obtain the following corollary of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.4. For a set S of latency functions satisfying Assumption 2.1, the approximation guarantee of
BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM and SCALEUNIFORMLY is at most
(a) 2, without further requirements on S .
(b) 54 , if S contains concave latencies only,
(c) 1 + ∆∆+1
(
1
∆+1
)1/∆
, if S contains only polynomials with non-negative coefficients and degree at most
∆, i.e., every S ∈ S is of the form S(x) =∑∆j=0 ajxj with aj ≥ 0 for all j.
4.2 Best-of-Two Approximation
In this section we show that although both BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM and SCALEUNIFORMLY achieve an
approximation guarantee of (1 + µ(S)) taking the better of the two algorithms we obtain a strictly better
performance guarantee.
The key idea of the proof is to extend the analysis of the BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM algorithm in order
to express its approximation guarantee as a function of the parameter p that measures the proportion of the
routing cost in the total cost of a relaxed solution. This allows us to determine the worst-case p for which
the approximation guarantee of the both algorithm is maximized.
Theorem 4.5. Taking the better solution of BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM and SCALEUNIFORMLY has an ap-
proximation guarantee of at most (γ(S)+µ(S)+1)2
(γ(S)+µ(S)+1)2−4µ(S)γ(S)
, which is strictly smaller than 1 + µ(S).
Proof. Recall from (4.8) that the approximation guarantee of the algorithm SCALEUNIFORMLY is(√
p+
√
µ(S)(1 − p))2, where p = CR(v∗,z∗)/C(v∗,z∗). We extend our analysis of BRINGTOEQUI-
LIBRIUM using this parameter p. With the notation in Theorem 4.2, by (4.5), BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM
returns a feasible solution (v∗,z) with
C(v∗, z) =
∑
e∈E
((
Se(δe) + S
′
e(δe) δe
)
v∗e + γe S
′
e(δe) δe v
∗
e
)
= pC(v∗, z∗) +
∑
e∈E
S′e(δe) δe v
∗
e(1 + γe)
≤ pC(v∗, z∗) + (1 + γ(S))
∑
e∈E
S′e(δe) δe v
∗
e = pC(v
∗, z∗) + (1 + γ(S))(1 − p)C(v∗, z∗)
=
(
1 + γ(S)(1 − p))C(v∗, z∗).
Thus, by taking the best of the two heuristics, we obtain an approximation guarantee of
max
p∈(0,1)
min
{
1 + γ(S)(1 − p),
(√
p+
√
µ(S)(1 − p)
)2}
.
The maximum of this expression is attained for
p = p∗ :=
(γ(S)− µ(S) + 1)2
(γ(S)− µ(S) + 1)2 + 4µ(S) (4.9)
which yields the claimed improved upper bound (cf. Lemma A.3 in the appendix for details).
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It is not necessary to run both approximation algorithms to get this approximation guarantee. Af-
ter computing the optimum solution to the relaxation (CNDP’), we can determine the value for p =
CR(v∗,z∗)/C(v∗,z∗) and proceed with SCALEUNIFORMLY if p ≤ p∗ (cf. (4.9)) and with BRINGTO-
EQUILIBRIUM otherwise.
Fort particular sets S of latency functions, we evaluate µ(S) and γ(S) and obtain the following corollary
of Theorem 4.5.
Corollary 4.6. For a set S of latency functions satisfying Assumption 2.1, the approximation guarantee in
Theorem 4.5 is at most
(a) 95 , without further requirements on S ,
(b) 4941 ≈ 1.195, if S contains concave latencies only.
(c) 1+ 4∆(∆+1)
2(2∆+1)(∆+1)1+1/∆+(∆+1)2(1+1/∆)+1
, if S contains only polynomials with non-negative coefficients
and degree at most ∆, i.e., every S ∈ S is of the form S(x) =∑∆j=0 ajxj with aj ≥ 0 for all j.
5 Conclusion
We reconsidered the classical continuous network design problem (CNDP). To the best of our knowledge,
we established the first hardness results for CNDP. Specifically, we have shown the APX-hardness of CNDP
both on directed and undirected networks and even if all latency functions are affine. We then turned to
the approximation of the problem. First, we provided a thorough analysis of an algorithm proposed and
studied by Marcotte [22] for monomial latency functions. We showed a general approximation guarantee
depending on the set of allowed cost functions which is related to the anarchy value of the set of cost
functions. Second, we proposed and studied a different approximation algorithm that turned out to provide
the same approximation guarantee. As our arguably most interesting result concerning approximation, we
then showed that taking the best of the two algorithms, we can guarantee a strictly better approximation
factor.
In the transportation literature, further variants of CNDP have been investigated. One such example are
situations in which the network designer is only interested in minimizing total travel time but investments are
restricted, e.g., by budget constraints. More generally, suppose there is a convex function g : Rm → Rk, k ∈
N such that for any feasible solution z the condition g(z) ≤ 0 must be satisfied. The function g, for instance,
can represent edge-specific budget constraints ℓeze ≤ Be for e ∈ E and/or a global budget constraint∑
e∈E ℓeze ≤ B. We arrive at the following budgeted continuous network design problem (bCNDP):
min
z≥0
min
v∈W(z)
∑
e∈E
Se(ve/ze) ve s.t. : g(z) ≤ 0. (bCNDP)
Using existing results from the price of anarchy literature (Roughgarden [29] and Correa et al. [9]),
we can show that there is a 4/3-approximation for affine latencies and assuming P 6= NP, for any ǫ > 0,
there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm with a performance guarantee better than 4/3− ǫ, see
Theorem A.4 in the appendix. For proving the lower bound, we use edge-specific budget constraints and
mimic a construction from Roughgarden [26]. It is an interesting open problem whether such a lower bound
can also be achieved if we allow only a global budget constraint.
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Appendix
Missing Material of Section 1
Table 1: Approximation guarantees of the algorithms BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM, SCALEUNIFORMLY, and the best of the two for
convex latency functions, concave latency functions and sets of polynomials with non-negative coefficients depending on the maxi-
mal degree∆. The approximation guarantees stated for convex latency functions even hold for sets of semi-convex latency functions
as in Assumption 2.1. For BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM, the approximation guarantees marked with (⋆) have been obtained before in
[22].
Approximation guarantees
Functions BRINGTOEQUILIBRIUM Better of the twoSCALEUNIFORMLY
concave 5/4 = 1.25 49/41 ≈ 1.195
convex 2 9/5 = 1.8
polynomials ∆
0 1 1
1/4 3381/3125 ≈ 1.082 ≈ 1.064
1/3 283/256 ≈ 1.105 ≈ 1.083
1/2 31/27 ≈ 1.148 1849/1657 ≈ 1.116
1 5/4 = 1.25 ⋆ 49/41 ≈ 1.195
2 1 + 2
9
√
3 ≈ 1.385⋆ 311
479
+ 180
479
√
3 ≈ 1.300
3 1 + 3
16
3
√
42 ≈ 1.472⋆ ≈ 1.369
4 1 + 4
25
4
√
53 ≈ 1.535⋆ ≈ 1.418
∞ 2 ⋆ 9/5 = 1.8
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. As the latency of all edges diverges to ∞ as the capacity approaches 0 we obtain ze > 0 if and only
if ve > 0 for all edges e ∈ E. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the relaxed problem (CNDP’) imply
that
∂
∂ze
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ve/ze) ve + ze ℓe
)
= 0,
or, equivalently, ℓe = (ve/ze)2S′e(ve/ze) for all e ∈ E with ze > 0. Using that x2S′e(x) is non-decreasing
and unbounded, for each e ∈ E there is a solution to the equation x2 S′e(x) = le which we denote by ue.
Since ℓe > 0, we derive that ue > 0 as well. By definition, ue is the unique optimal ratio of ve/ze for
edge e with ze > 0 in an optimal solution of (CNDP’). Substituting ze = ve/ue in (CNDP’), we obtain the
equivalent mathematical problem
min
v∈F
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ue) + ℓe/ue
)
ve,
which can be solved by performing |K| independent shortest path computations, one for each commodity
k ∈ K .
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. CNDP lies in NP as a vector of capacities z is a polynomial certificate. Given z, we can compute in
polynomial time a corresponding Wardrop equilibrium and the total cost C(v,z).
To show the NP-hardness of the problem, we reduce from 3-SAT. Let φ be a Boolean formula in
conjunctive normal form. We denote the set of variables and clauses of φ with V (φ) and K(φ), respectively,
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sjx1
tjx1
sjx2
tjx2
. . . sjxν tjxν
sj1 tj1
sj2 tj2 . . .
sjκ tjκ
Figure 1: Network used to show the hardness of the continuous network design problem. Clause 1 is equal to x1∨ x¯2∨xν . Dashed
edges have zero latency.
and set ν = |V (φ)| and κ = |K(φ)|. The set L(φ) of literals of φ contains for each variable xi ∈ V (φ)
the positive literal xi and the negative literal x¯i, i.e., L(φ) = {xi ∈ V (φ)} ∪ {x¯i : xi ∈ V (φ)}. In the
following, we will associate clauses with the set of literals that they contain.
We now explain the construction of a continuous network design problem based on φ that has the prop-
erty that, for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1/8), an optimal solution has total cost less or equal to (4 + ǫ)κ + 2κν if
and only if φ has a solution. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1/8) be arbitrary. For each clause k ∈ K(φ), we introduce a
clause edge ek with latency function Sek(vek/zek) = 4 + vek/zek and construction cost ℓek = (ǫ/2)2. For
each literal l ∈ L(φ) and each clause k ∈ K(φ), we introduce a literal edge el,k with latency function
Sel,k(vel,k/zel,k) = vel,k/zel,k and cost ℓel,k = 1. We denote the set of clause edges and literal edges by EK
and EL, respectively.
For each variable xi ∈ V (φ), there is a variable commodity jxi with source sjxi , sink tjxi and demand
djxi = 1. This commodity has two feasible paths, one path uses exclusively the literal edges {exi,k :
k ∈ K(φ)} that correspond to the non-negated variable xi, the correspond to the negated variable x¯i. In
that way, each feasible path of the variable commodity jxi corresponds to a true/false assignment of the
variable xi. For each clause k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k , we introduce a clause commodity jk with source sjk , sink
tjk and demand djk = 1. The clause commodity may either choose its corresponding clause edge ek or the
corresponding literal edges that occur in k, i.e., elk ,k, el′k,k, and el′′k ,k. For notational convenience, we set
Ek = {elk ,k, el′k ,k, el′′k ,k}. We add some additional edges with latency 0 to obtain a network; see Figure 1
where these edges are dashed. Note that the problem remains NP-hard, even if we do not allow edges with
zero latency, see Remark A.1 after this proof.
First, we show that an optimal solution of the so-defined instance of the continuous network design
problem P has total cost less or equal to (4+ǫ)κ+2κν, if φ has a solution. To this end, let y = (yxi)xi∈V (φ)
be a solution of φ. Then, a feasible solution of P is as follows: For each positive literal xi that is selected in
the solution yi, we buy capacity 1 for the corresponding negative literal edges {ex¯i,k : k ∈ K(φ)}, and vice
versa. Formally, we set
zal,k =


1, if l = xi and yxi = false,
1, if l = x¯i and yxi = true,
0, otherwise.
For each clause edge ek, k ∈ K(φ), we buy capacity 2/ǫ. This particular capacity vector z = (ze)e∈E
implies that each variable commodity jxi has a unique path of finite length, i.e., the path using the edges
corresponding to the negation of the corresponding literal in y. Using that y is a solution of φ, we further
obtain that for each clause commodity jk at least one of the edges in Ek has capacity zero and, thus, infinite
latency. This implies that, in the unique Wardrop equilibrium, the demand of each clause commodity jk is
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routed along the corresponding clause edge ek. For the total cost of this solution, we obtain
C(v, z) =
∑
e∈EK
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
+
∑
e∈EL
(
(ve/ze)ve + ze
)
=
∑
e∈EK
(
(4 + ǫ/2) + (ǫ/2)
)
+
1
2
∑
e∈EL
(
1 + 1
)
= (4 + ǫ)κ+ 2κν. (A.1)
Hence, an optimal solution has cost not larger than (A.1) if φ has a solution.
We proceed to prove that the total cost of an optimal solution are strictly larger than (A.1) if φ does not
admit a solution. Let z = (ze)e∈E be an optimal solution of P and let v = (ve)e∈E be a corresponding
Wardrop flow. We distinguish two cases.
First case: vek > 0 for all k ∈ K(φ), i.e., each clause commodity jk sends flow over the corresponding
clause edge ek.
Before we prove the thesis for this case, we need some additional notation. For the Wardrop flow ve
on edge e ∈ E, let vVe and vKe denote the flow on e that is due to the variable commodities and the clause
commodities, respectively.
We claim that there is a clause k˜ ∈ K(φ), k˜ = lk˜ ∨ l′k˜∨ l′′k˜ such that the flow of the variable commodities
on each of the corresponding literal edges in Ek˜ = {elk˜ ,k˜, el′k˜ ,k˜, el′′k˜ ,k˜} is at least 1/2, i.e.,
vVe
l
k˜
,k˜
≥ 1/2, vVe
l′
k˜
,k˜
≥ 1/2, and vVe
l′′
k˜
,k˜
≥ 1/2. (A.2)
For a contradiction, let us assume that for each clause k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ k′′k there is a literal l∗k ∈ {lk, l′k, l′′k}
such that vVel∗
k
,k
< 1/2. As each variable xi ∈ V (φ) splits its unit demand between the path consisting of the
positive literal edges {exi,k : k ∈ K(φ)} and the path consisting of the negative literal edges {ex¯i,k : k ∈
K(φ)}, at most one of these two paths is used with a flow strictly smaller than 1/2. Thus, the assignment
vector y defined as
yxi =


true, if vVe < 1/2 for all e ∈ {exi,k : k ∈ K(φ)},
false, if vVe < 1/2 for all e ∈ {ex¯i,k : k ∈ K(φ)},
true, otherwise,
is well-defined. By construction, y satisfies all clauses, which is a contradiction to the assumption that no
such assignment exists. We conclude that there is a clause k˜ such that (A.2) holds.
We proceed to bound the total cost of a solution. As v is a Wardrop equilibrium in which the clause
commodity jk˜ uses at least partially the clause edge ek˜, we further derive that
∑
e∈Ek˜
ve/ze ≥ vek˜/zek˜ > 4.
We bound the total cost of the solution (v,z) by observing
C(v, z) =
∑
e∈EL
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
≥
∑
e∈EL
minze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
minze≥0
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
,
where we slightly abuse notation by writing minze≥0 shorthand for minze≥0:v∈W(z). We obtain an upper
bound by relaxing minze≥0 to minze≥0 for the edges in EL \Ek˜ and EK . Hence,
C(v, z) ≥
∑
e∈EL\Ek˜
min
ze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈E
k˜
min
ze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
min
ze≥0
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
.
Calculating the respective minima, we obtain
C(v, z) =
∑
e∈EL\Ek˜
2ve +
∑
e∈E
k˜
min
ze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2ve
+
∑
e∈EK
(4 + ǫ)ve. (A.3)
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Each clause commodity jk can route its demand either over the clause edge ek or over the three literal edges
in Ek. Every fraction of the demand routed over the clause edge contributes 4 + ǫ to the expression on the
right hand side of (A.3) while it contributes at least 6 when routed over the literal edges. Thus, the right
hand side of (A.3) is minimized when the clause commodities do not use the literal edges at all. We then
obtain
C(v, z) ≥
∑
e∈EL\Ek˜
2vVe +
∑
e∈E
k˜
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
+ (4 + ǫ)|EK |
= 2
(
κν −
∑
e∈E
k˜
vVe
)
+ (4 + ǫ)κ+
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
,
= 2κν + (4 + ǫ)κ+
∑
e∈E
k˜
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze − 2vVe
)
,
> 2κν + (4 + ǫ)κ+Q,
where Q is the solution to the constrained minimization problem
Q = min
vVe ,ze>0
e∈E
k˜
∑
e∈E
k˜
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze − 2vVe
)
s.t.:
∑
e∈E
k˜
vVe /ze ≥ 4 (A.4)
vVe ≥ 1/2 for all e ∈ Ek˜. (A.5)
Side constraint (A.4) is a relaxation of the requirement that v is a Wardrop equilibrium as the latency
of the literal edges is strictly larger than 4. Side constraint (A.5) is due to the fact that for clause k˜ the
three corresponding literal edges elk˜ ,k˜, el′k˜,k˜
, and el′′
k˜
,k˜ are used with a flow of at least 1/2 by the variable
commodities. The optimal solution to the constraint optimization problem Q is equal to Q = 1/8 and is
attained for vVe = 1/2 and ze = 3/8 for all e ∈ Ek˜. This implies that the total cost of a solution is not
smaller than (4 + ǫ)κ+ 2κν + 1/8, which finishes the first case of this proof.
Second case: There is a clause commodity jk˜ that does not use its clause edge ek˜, i.e., vek˜ = 0. As for
first case, we observe
C(v, z) =
∑
e∈EL
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
(4ve + v
2
e/ze + (ǫ/2)
2ze) ≥
∑
e∈EL
2ve +
∑
e∈EK
(4 + ǫ)ve.
Using that jk˜ does not use its clause edge, we derive that the flow on the literal edges amounts to νκ+3 and we obtain
C(v, z) ≥ 2(κν + 3) + (4 + ǫ)(κ− 1) = 2κν + (4 + ǫ)κ+ 2,
which concludes the proof.
In the following remark we discuss that although the hardness proof of Theorem 3.1 used edges with
zero latency, the hardness result continues to hold even if edges with zero latency are not allowed.
Remark A.1. The continuous network design problem is NP-hard in the strong sense, even if no edges with
zero latency are allowed.
Sketch of proof. Let M be an upper bound on the total cost of an optimal solution to a continuous network
design problem constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 and let E0 be the set of edges with zero latency. We
replace each edge e ∈ E0, e = (s, t), s, t ∈ V by an edge e′ = (s, t) with latency function Se′(ve′/ze′) =
ve′/ze′ and construction cost ℓe′ = ( ǫ2M )
2
. For each new edge e′, we introduce an additional commodity
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ie′ with source s, sink t and demand M . To route the flow of commodity ie′ , each solution has to buy
a sufficient capacity for the edge e′. For ze′ = 4M3/ǫ the additional total cost on edge e′ are ǫ. Thus,
the routing cost and the total cost on the new edges can be made arbitrarily small. In conclusion, we can
approximate the behavior of edges with zero latency within arbitrary precision by edges with unbounded
latency functions.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. We reduce from a symmetric variant of 4-OCC-MAX-3-SAT which is NP-hard to approximate,
see Berman et al. [4]. An instance of 4-OCC-MAX-3-SAT, is given by a Boolean formula φ in conjunc-
tive normal form with the property that each clause contains exactly three literals and each variable occurs
exactly four times. The problem to determine the maximal number of clauses that can be satisfied simulta-
neously is known to be NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 1016/1015 − δ ≈ 1.00099 − δ for any
δ > 0, even for the special case that each variable occurs exactly twice as a positive literal and exactly twice
as a negative literal, see a follow-up paper by the same authors [5].
Let us again denote by V (φ), K(φ), and L(φ) the set of variables, clauses and literals of φ and let
ν = |V (φ)| and κ = |K(φ)|. It is convenient to assume that K(φ) = {1, . . . , κ} and V (φ) = {x1, . . . , xν}.
As every variable occurs exactly four times and every clause contains exactly three literals, we have 4ν = 3κ.
We slightly adjust the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.1 to make use of the information that each
literal occurs in exactly two clauses. We proceed to explain the construction of an instance of CNDP relative
to a fixed parameter ǫ ∈ (0, 1/8). For a literal l ∈ L(φ), let kl, k′l ∈ K(φ) be the clauses that contain
the literal l. We introduce two literal edges el,kl and el,k′l with latency function Se(ve/ze) = ve/ze and
construction cost ℓe = 1. For each variable xi ∈ V (φ), we introduce a corresponding variable commodity
jxi with source sjxi , sink tjxi and demands dxi = 1 that may then either choose the path consisting of
the edges exi,kxi and exi,k′xi that correspond to the positive literal xi or the edges ex¯i,kx¯i and ex¯i,k′x¯i that
correspond to the negative literal x¯i. We construct the network such that in the directed path containing
the edges exi,k and exi,k′ the edge exi,k appears before the edge exi,k′ if and only if k < k′, i.e., the
corresponding clause k has a smaller index than the respective clause k′. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, for
each clause k ∈ K(φ), k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k , we introduce a clause edge ek with latency Se(ve/ze) = 4 + ve/ze
and construction cost ℓe = (ǫ/2)2. For each clause k ∈ K(φ), there is a clause commodity jk with source
sjk , sink tjk and demand djk = 1. The clause commodity jk may choose either the clause edge ek or a path
that contains all the corresponding literal edges elk,k, el′k ,k, el′′k ,k. The set of literal edges and clause edges is
denoted by EL and EK , respectively. For notational convenience, for a clause k ∈ K(φ), k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k ,
we set Ek = {elk ,k, el′k ,k, el′′k ,k}. We add some additional edges with zero latency to obtain a network,
see Figure 2. Because in each path for a variable commodity the clauses appear in increasing order of their
index, adding these additional edges with zero latency does not add any further paths to the literal or variable
commodities.
The hardness result continues to hold, even if edges with zero latency are not allowed, see Remark A.1
after the proof of Theorem 3.1.
We claim that the so-defined instance of CNDP has a solution with total cost in the interval[
10κ+ |K˜|/4, (10 + ǫ)κ+ (1/4 + ǫ/2)|K˜|
]
if and only if the minimum number of unsatisfied clauses is |K˜|.
First, we show that an optimal solution has total cost not larger than (10+ǫ)κ+ |K˜ |/4 if φ has a solution
y that violates |K˜| clauses only. To this end, let y = (yxi)xi∈V (φ) be such a solution and let K˜ be the set of
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sjx1
tjx1
sjx2
tjx2
. . . sjxν tjxν
sj1 tj1
sj2 tj2 . . .
sjκ tjκ
Figure 2: Network used to show the APX-hardness of the continuous network design problem. Clause 1 is equal to x1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ xν .
Dashed edges have zero latency.
clauses that is not satisfied by y. Consider the tuple (v,z) defined as
zel,k =


1, if k /∈ K˜ and l = ¬yi for some i ∈ V (φ),
1
4/3+ǫ/6 , if k ∈ K˜ and l = ¬yi for some i ∈ V (φ),
0, otherwise,
for all l ∈ L(φ), k ∈ {kl, k′l},
vel,k =
{
1, if l = ¬yi for some i ∈ V (φ),
0, otherwise,
for all l ∈ L(φ), k ∈ {kl, k′l},
zek = 2/ǫ, for all k ∈ K(φ).
vek = 1, for all k ∈ K(φ).
First, we show that the tuple (v,z) is a solution to CNDP. To this end, it suffices to prove that v is a
Wardrop equilibrium for the latency functions defined by z. We will argue for each commodity separately
that it only uses shortest paths, starting with an arbitrary clause commodity jk that corresponds to a non-
satisfied clause k ∈ K˜ , k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k . Such a clause uses the clause edge ek with latency 4 + ǫ/2. On
the other hand, the corresponding literal edges elk ,k, el′k ,k, and el′′k ,k have capacity
1
4/3+ǫ/6 and carry one
unit of flow of the variable commodities. Thus, their latencies sum up to 4 + ǫ/2, implying that clause
commodity jk is in equilibrium. Next, consider a clause commodity jk that corresponds to a satisfied clause
k ∈ K(φ)\K˜ , k = lk∨ l′k∨ l′′k . As k is satisfied by y, there is a literal l∗k ∈ {lk, l′k, l′′k} such that l∗k = yxi for
some xi ∈ V (φ). This implies that zel∗
k
,k
= 0 and, thus, edge el∗k,k has infinite latency. We derive that clause
commodity jk has a unique path of finite latency and this path is used in v. Finally, consider a variable
commodity jxi , xi ∈ V (xi). As we buy either the capacity for the edges {exi,kxi , exi,k′xi} corresponding
to the positive literal or the edges {ex¯i,kx¯i , ex¯i,k′x¯i} that correspond to the negative literal, but not both,
commodity jxi has only one path with finite latency, and it uses that path in v.
We proceed to calculate the total cost of the solution (v,z). Every literal edge that corresponds to a
satisfied clause and the negation of a literal in yi has capacity 1 and flow 1 and thus causes a total cost of 2.
In contrast to this, each literal edge that corresponds to a violated clause and the negation of a literal in yi
has capacity 14/3+ǫ/6 and flow 1 and, thus, causes a total cost of
4
3
+
ǫ
6
+
1
4/3 + ǫ/6
≤ 25
12
+
ǫ
6
.
Further, each clause edge has capacity 2/ǫ and is used by 1 unit of flow and, thus, contributes 4 + ǫ to the
total cost. We calculate
C(v, z) ≤ 3(2(κ− |K˜|) + (25/12 + ǫ/6)|K˜|)+ (4 + ǫ)κ
= (10 + ǫ)κ+ (1/4 + ǫ/2)|K˜|.
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We proceed to prove that an optimal solution of CNDP has total cost not smaller than 10κ + K˜/4 if
each solution y of φ violates at least K˜ clauses. To this end, we need some additional notation. For an edge
flow v, let vV denote the edge flow that is due to the variable commodities and vK denote the edge flow
that is due to the clause commodities. For a clause k ∈ K(φ), let mk(vV ) = mine∈Ek vVe . In addition, we
set K¯(vK) = {k ∈ K : vKek > 0}, i.e., K¯(vK) is the set of clauses k that uses (at least partially) its clause
edge ek.
We bound C(v,z) by observing
C(v, z) =
∑
e∈EL
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
≥
∑
e∈EL
min
ze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
+
∑
e∈EK
min
ze≥0
(
(4 + ve/ze)ve + (ǫ/2)
2ze
)
,
where we again slightly abused notation writing minze≥0 shorthand for minze≥0:v∈W(z). We obtain a lower
bound on the total cost observing that the latency of the clause edges is at least 4. Thus,
C(v, z) ≥
∑
e∈EL
min
ze≥0
(
v2e/ze + ze
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2
+4
∑
e∈EK
ve (A.6)
Every unit of flow of a clause commodity jk with k ∈ K¯(vK), k = lk ∨ l′k ∨ l′′k contributes at least 6
to the right hand side of (A.6) when routed over the corresponding literal edges elk ,k, el′k,k, and el′′k ,k, but
contributes only 4 when routed over the corresponding clause edge ek. Thus, we obtain a lower bound
assuming that each clause commodities jk, k ∈ K¯(vK) exclusively uses its clause edge, i.e.,
C(v, z) ≥ 4|K¯(vV )|+
∑
k∈K(φ)
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe + v
K
e )
2/ze + ze
)
. (A.7)
With the same arguments, we observe that every clause commodity jk with k ∈ K(φ) \ K¯(vK) contributes
at least 6 to the right hand side of (A.7) when routed over the literal edges, but contributes only 4 when
routed over the clause edge. Thus, we obtain a lower bound assuming that K(φ) = K¯(vK), i.e., every
clause commodity jk routes its demand exclusively over the corresponding clause edge ek. Then,
C(v, z) ≥ 4κ+
∑
k∈K(φ)
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
= 4κ+
∑
k∈K(φ)
mk(v
V )=0
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
+
∑
k∈K(φ)
mk(v
V )>0
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
Note that for all clauses k ∈ K(φ) with mk(vV ) = 0 at least one of the corresponding clause edges is
not used by the variable commodities and, thus, we can set the capacity of this edge to 0. This implies
that the corresponding clause commodity k stays at its clause edge and we can optimize the capacity of the
remaining edges in Ek irrespective of the equilibrium constraints. We obtain
C(v, z) ≥ 4κ+ 6|k ∈ K(φ) : mk(vV ) = 0|+
∑
k∈K(φ)
mk(v
V )>0
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze
)
≥ 10κ+
∑
k∈K(φ)
mk(v
V )>0
∑
e∈Ek
min
ze≥0
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze − 2vVe
)
≥ 10κ+
∑
k∈K(φ)
Qk,
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where each Qk is the solution to the constrained minimization problem
Qk = min
vVe ,ze>0
e∈Ek
∑
e∈Ek
(
(vVe )
2/ze + ze − 2vVe
)
s.t.:
∑
e∈Ek
vVe /ze ≥ 4
vVe ≥ mk for all e ∈ Ek.v
The optimal solution to this problem is equal to Qk = mk(vV )/4 and is attained for vVe = mk(vV ) and
ze = 3mk(v
V )/4 for all e ∈ Ek, k ∈ K(φ). We obtain
C(v, z) ≥ 10κ+
∑
k∈K(φ)
mk(v
V )/4.
To finish the proof it suffices to show that
∑
k∈K(φ)mk(v
V ) ≥ K˜ for each flow of the variable com-
modities vV . To this end, let vV be a flow that minimizes
∑
k∈K(φ)mk(v
V ). We claim that it is without
loss of generality to assume that vV is integral. To see this claim, suppose that the flow for all variable
commodities except jxi is fixed and consider the variable commodity jxi . Let p denote the portion of the
flow sent over the path consisting of the positive literal edges exi,kxi and exi,k′xi . By definition, only the
clauses kxi and kx′i contain the literal xi and only the clauses kx¯i and k
′
x¯i contain the literal x¯i. Then, we
can calculate the contribution of these four clauses to
∑
k∈K(φ)mk(v
v) as follows:∑
k∈{kxi ,k
′
xi
,kx¯i ,k
′
x¯i
}
mk(v
V ) =
∑
k∈{kxi ,k
′
xi
,kx¯i ,k
′
x¯i
}
min
e∈Ek
vVe
=
∑
k∈{kxi ,k
′
xi
}
min
(
p, min
e∈Ek\exi,k
v
V
e
)
+
∑
k∈{kx¯i ,k
′
x¯i
}
min
(
1− p, min
e∈Ek\ex¯i,k
v
V
e
)
For a fixed flow vV on the literal edges not involving xi, this expression is concave in p. Hence,
the minimum is attained for either p = 0 or p = 1. Put differently, for any flow of the other variable
commodities, the expression
∑
k∈K(φ)mk(v
V ) is minimized when variable commodity jxi routes all of its
demand on one path. Iterating this argument for all variable commodities, we conclude that is without loss
of generality to assume that vV is integral.
For an integral flow vV of the variable commodities, consider the true/false assignment y = (yxi)xi∈V (φ)
defied as yi = true if and only if vyi,kyi = 0. As this assignment satisfies at most K
∗ clauses, we have that∑
k∈K(φ)mk(v
V ) ≥ K˜.
Plugging everything together, we obtain that the total cost of an optimal solution to CNDP lies in the
range [
10κ+ |K˜|/4, (10 + ǫ)κ+ (1/4 + ǫ/2)|K˜|
]
(A.8)
if |K˜| clauses cannot be satisfied.
Berman et al. [4, 5] construct a family of symmetric instances of 4-OCC-MAX-3-SAT with κ =
1016n, n ∈ N that has the property that for any δ ∈ (0, 1/2) it is NP-hard to distinguish between the
systems where (1016 − δ)n clauses can be satisfied and systems where at most (1015 + ǫ)n clauses can be
satisfied. Using (A.8), the corresponding instances of CNDP have the property that they have total cost at
most (10 + ǫ)1016n + δn(14 +
ǫ
2), if at least (1016 − δ)n clauses can be satisfied, and total cost at least
10 · 1016n + 1/4 − δn4 , if at most (1015 + δ)n clauses can be satisfied. As we let ǫ and δ go to zero, we
derive that it is NP-hard to approximate CNDP by any factor better than 10160.25/10160 ≈ 1.000024. This
proves the APX-hardness of the problem.
20
sjx1
type one
tjx1
type two
sjx2
tjx2
. . . sjxν tjxν
sj1 tj1
sj2 tj2 . . .
sjκ tjκ
type five
type three
type four
Figure 3: Network used to show the APX-hardness of the continuous network design problem on undirected graphs. Clause 1 is
equal to x1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ xν . The clause edges (straight lines in the upper part of the graph) and the literal edges (straight edges in the
lower part of the graph) are connected via different auxiliary edges (dashed). The auxiliary edges have different constant latencies
dependent on their type. Type one edges are auxiliary edges adjacent to a source or a target of a variable commodity. Type two
edges are auxiliary edges connecting two literal edges that correspond to the same literal. Type three edges are auxiliary edges
adjacent to the a source or a target of a clause commodity. Type four edges are auxiliary edges connecting two literal edges that
correspond that correspond to different literals that appear together in a clause. Type five edges connect the source of a clause
commodity with the respective clause edge.
Hardness for undirected networks
Theorem A.2. The continuous network design problem on undirected networks is APX-hard, even if all
latency functions are affine.
Sketch of proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we reduce from a symmetric variant of 4-OCC-MAX-
3-SAT where each variable occurs exactly twice negated and twice unnegated. We will closely mimic the
proof of Theorem 3.2 and only sketch how to adjust it to the undirected case.
We use a construction similar to the directed case, see Figure 3. We carefully choose the latency of
the auxiliary edges in order to prevent the commodities from taking undesired paths. For each variable
commodity jxi , let us call the two dashed edges adjacent to sjxi and the two edges adjacent to tjxi type one
edges. Further, let us call the dashed edge between the edges exi,k and exi,k′ and between ex¯i,k and ex¯i,k′
type two edges. For each clause commodity ji, we call the dashed edge connecting sji the a variable gadget
and the dashed edge adjacent to tji type three edges. We call the dashed edges connecting two literal edges
corresponding to different variables but the same clause type four edges. Finally, we call the dashed edges
that connect the source node of a clause commodity with the respective clause edge type five edges.
We set the latency of the type one edges to 50, of the type two edges to 100, of the type three edges to 0,
of the type four edges to 20, and of the type five edges to 40.
We claim that the total cost of an optimal solution to CNDP lies in the range[
200κ+ |K˜|/4, (200 + ǫ)κ+ (1/4 + ǫ/2)|K˜|
]
(A.9)
if exactly |K˜| clauses cannot be satisfied.
To see the upper bound in (A.9), fix an assignment of the variables that satisfies κ − |K˜| clauses and
construct a solution to CNDP analogously to the proof of the directed case, i.e., route all clause commodities
along the clause edges, all variable edges along the negation of the assignment of the variable and choose the
installed capacities as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We will show that with these capacities the constructed
flow is a Wardrop equilibrium. Since the auxiliary edges have non-zero latency, compared to the solution in
the directed case, the latency cost of each clause commodity increased by 40 and the latency cost of each
variable commodity increased by 200. Thus, the total cost increased by 40κ+ 34 ·200κ = 190κ giving a total
cost of (200+ǫ)κ+(1/4+ǫ/2)|K˜ |. It is left to argue that this solution still constitutes a Wardrop equilibrium
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although all edges can now be used in both directions. To this end, note that each clause commodity uses its
clause edge and experiences a total latency of 40 + 4 + ǫ/2 = 44 + ǫ/2. However, each other path available
to a clause commodity uses either a type two edge (with latency 100), or two type three edges, two type
four edges (each with latency 20), and the three corresponding literal edges (with latencies summing up to
4+ǫ/2, as before). Thus, no clause commodity wants to deviate to another path and the constructed solution
is a Wardrop equilibrium analogously to the directed case.
For the lower bound, we argue as follows. If no variable commodity uses a type three edge or a type
four edge, then each variable commodity has to split its flow between the path corresponding to the positive
and the negative literal, respectively, and the lower bound can be proven analogously to the directed case.
So we are left with cases that a variable commodity uses a type three edge or a type four edge. Let us
first assume that we have an optimal solution, in which a variable commodity uses a type four edge. We may
assume without loss of generality that every literal edge that carries flow has a latency of at most 5, because
we could decrease the total cost by increasing the capacity on these edges, otherwise. (However, we may
not decrease the latency below 4+ ǫ/2 because this might give an incentive to the clause commodities to use
these edges as well.) Every path available to a variable commodity uses at least two type one edges as these
edges are adjacent to the source and target of each variable commodity. It is also not hard to see that every
path available to a variable commodity has to use at least either two additional type one edges or one type
two edge. Using that the variable commodity also uses a type four edge, this implies that the latency of the
variable commodity is at least 200 + 20. However, it would also be feasible to route that variable along the
path corresponding to the positive literal say while installing an additional capacity of 1/5 on the two literal
edges of the positive literal resulting in a total cost of 200 + 10 + 2/5 < 220. This low capacity would not
prevent any of the clause commodities from using their clause edge and has a lower total cost. Thus, we may
conclude that no variable commodity uses a type four edge. As any path of a variable commodity that uses
a type three edge also uses a type five edge with latency 40, we may conclude that no variable commodity
uses such an edge as well.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. We solve the relaxed problem (CNDP’). As in the proof of Proposition 2.4, for each edge e ∈ E, we
find a solution to the equation x2S′e(x) = le, which we denote by ue. Then, we find an unsplittable flow that
minimizes
min
v∈F
∑
e∈E
(
Se(ue) + ℓe/ue
)
ve, (A.10)
Let T be a shortest path tree routed in t w.r.t. the edge weights we = Se(ue) + ℓe/ue. By construction, each
commodity k has a unique path in T that connects the source sk to the joint sink t. For each e ∈ T , let de be
the sum of the demands of the commodities that use edge e in T along its path. For each edge e ∈ T we buy
capacity ze = de/ue and route a flow of de. All other edges have zero capacity and, thus, infinite latency. By
construction, the total cost of this solution equals (A.10). Also, the resulting flow is a Wardrop equilibrium
as every commodity k has a unique path from sk to t that uses only edges with non-zero capacity.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. The expression supx≥0maxγ∈[0,1] γ
(
1− S(γ x)S(x)
)
is non-negative and strictly positive for γ ∈ (0, 1),
thus, the inner maximum is attained for γ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, γ satisfies the first order optimality conditions
0 =
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
− γ x · S
′(γ x)
S(x)
⇔ S(x) = S(γ x) + γ xS′(γ x)
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By substituting y = γ x, we obtain
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
= sup
y≥0
{
γ
(
1− S(y)
S(y/γ)
)
: γ ∈ [0, 1] with S(y/γ) = S(y) + S′(y) y
}
= sup
y≥0
{
γ · S
′(y) y
S(y) + S′(y) y
: γ ∈ [0, 1] with S(y/γ) = S(y) + S′(y) y
}
,
which proves the lemma.
Additional material for the proof of Theorem 4.5
Lemma A.3. For all γ, µ ∈ (0, 1], we have
max
p∈(0,1)
min
{
1 + γ(1− p),
(√
p+
√
µ(1 − p)
)2}
=
(γ + µ+ 1)2
(γ + µ+ 1)2 − 4µγ < 1 + µ. (A.11)
Proof. Observe that 1 + γ(1− p) is decreasing in p. Elementary calculus shows that
(√
p+
√
µ(1− p)
)2
attains its maximum at p = pˆ := 11+µ , is increasing when p < pˆ and decreasing afterwards. Now,
(√
pˆ +√
µ(1− pˆ)
)2
= 1 + µ and 1 + γ(1− pˆ) = 1 + µ γ1+µ < 1 + µ, the inequality in (A.11) follows.
Moreover, it follows that the maximum on the left hand side of (A.11) is attained for the unique p∗ ∈
(0, pˆ) such that 1 + γ(1− p∗) = (√p∗ +√µ(1− p∗))2. Thus, p∗ is a solution to the equation
0 = −(1− p∗)− γ(1− p∗) + 2
√
p∗(1− p∗)µ+ µ(1− p∗)
= (1− p∗)
(
2
√
µ
p∗
1− p∗ + µ− γ − 1
)
and since p∗ < 1
0 = 2
√
µ
p∗
1− p∗ + µ− γ(S)− 1.
The unique solution to this equation is
p∗ =
(γ − µ+ 1)2
(γ − µ+ 1)2 + 4µ.
Plugging this into the left hand side of (A.11) gives
(γ + µ+ 1)2
(γ + µ+ 1)2 − 4µγ ,
which proves the identity in (A.11).
Proof of Corollary 4.4 and Corollary 4.6
Proof. For the proofs of Corollary 4.4 and Corollary 4.6, we give bounds on µ(S) and γ(S) for the re-
spective sets S of allowable latency functions. Theorem 4.2, Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.5 then give the
respective approximation guarantees.
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Arbitrary latency functions. First, we consider case (a) of both Corollaries, where S is a class of arbitrary
non-negative and non-decreasing latencies. We observe that
µ(S) = sup
S∈S
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
≤ 1.
By definition γ(S) ≤ 1. Now Corollary 4.4 (a) follows immediately and Corollary 4.6 (b) follows from the
fact that
(γ(S) + µ(S) + 1)2
(γ(S) + µ(S) + 1)2 − 4µ(S)γ(S) (A.12)
is strictly increasing in γ(S) and µ(S).
Concave latency functions. Next, consider case (b) of both Corollaries, where S contains concave latencies
only. Observe that
µ(S) = sup
S∈S
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
≤ sup
S∈S
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1− γ − (1− γ)S(0)
S(x)
)
≤ max
γ∈[0,1]
γ(1− γ)
= 1/4,
where the first inequality uses the concavity of all functions S ∈ S . Further, as shown in Lemma 4.1, the
γ for which the inner maximum is attained, satisfies the first order optimality conditions S(x) = S(γx) +
γ xS′(γx). As S is concave, we derive that γ xS′(γx) ≤ S(γx), which implies
S(x) ≥ 2S(γx) ≥ 2(γS(x) + (1 − γ)S(0)) ≥ 2γS(x),
and, thus, γ(S) ≤ 1/2. Again, Corollary 4.4 (b) follows immediately and Corollary 4.6 (b) follows from
the fact that (A.12) is increasing in γ(S) and µ(S).
Polynomial latency functions. Finally, consider case (c) of both Corollaries, where for some fixed maximal
degree ∆ ≥ 0, the set S contains only polynomial latency functions of type S(x) =∑∆j=0 ajxj , with aj ≥ 0
for all j. Denote a = (aj)j∈[0,∆]. We calculate
µ(S) = sup
S∈S
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1− S(γ x)
S(x)
)
= sup
a≥0
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(
1−
∑∆
j=0 ajγ
jxj∑∆
j=0 ajx
j
)
= sup
a≥0
sup
x≥0
max
γ∈[0,1]
γ
(∑∆
j=0 ajx
j(1− γj)∑∆
j=0 ajx
j
)
As (1 − γj) is increasing in j for every γ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that the supremum over a ≥ 0 is attained if a∆ > 0 and
aj = 0 for all j ∈ [0,∆− 1]. We get
µ(S) = max
γ∈[0,1]
γ(1− γ∆)
=
( 1
∆ + 1
)1/∆(
1− 1
∆ + 1
)
=
( 1
∆ + 1
)1/∆( ∆
∆+ 1
)
,
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which directly implies the statement of Corollary 4.4 (c). Further, this value is attained for γ(S) =(
1
∆+1
)1/p
. Plugging these values in (A.12) and rearranging terms, we obtain the approximation guaran-
tee claimed in Corollary 4.6 (c).
Convex budget constraints
Theorem A.4. Let S be a class of latency functions.
1. The following algorithm is a 11−µ(S) -approximation for (bCNDP)
(in particular a 4/3-approximation for affine latencies):
(a) Compute a solution (v∗,z∗) to relaxation (bCNDP).
(b) Compute a Wardrop equilibrium w ∈ W(z∗).
(c) Return (w,z∗).
2. For affine latencies, there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm with a performance guar-
antee better than 4/3 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0, unless P = NP.
Proof. The upper bound in 1. is straight forward by using well known price of anarchy results known in the
literature, cf. Correa et al. [9] and Roughgarden [29] and Roughgarden and Tardos [27]. For 2., we mimic
the construction put forward in Roughgarden [26].
We reduce from the 2-Directed-Vertex-Disjoint-Paths (2DDP) problem, which is strongly NP-complete.
Given a directed graph G = (V,E) and two node pairs (s1, t1), (s2, t2) the problem is to decide whether
there exist a pair of vertex-disjoint paths P1 and P2, where P1 and P2 are (s1, t1) and (s2, t2)-paths, respec-
tively.
We will show that a (43 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm can be used to differentiate between “Yes” and
“No” instances of 2DDP in polynomial time. Given an instance I of 2DDPwe construct a graph G′ by
adding a super source s and a super sink t to the network. We connect s to s1 and s2 and t1 and t2 to t,
respectively. The latency functions of the added edges are set to Se(ve/ze) = ve/ze for e ∈ {(s, s1), (t2, t)}
and Se(ve/ze) = 1 + ve/ze for e ∈ {(s, s2), (t1, t)}. The function g(z) assigns edge-specific budgets
according to B(s,s1) = 1 and B(t2,t) = 1. The per-unit cost of capacities are given by ℓe = 1 for e ∈
{(s, s1), (t2, t)} and ℓe = 0, otherwise.
We proceed to prove the following two statements:
1. If I is a “Yes” instance of 2DDP, then G′ admits a solution (v,z) with v ∈ W(z) satisfying
C(v,z) ≤ 3/2.
2. If I is a “no” instance of 2DDP, then C(v,z) ≥ 2 for all (v,z) with v ∈ W(z).
To see the first statement, suppose I is a “Yes” instance and let P1 and P2 be the respective disjoint
paths. For all edges contained in neither P1 nor P2, we install a capacity of 0 leading to infinite latency of
these edges. For the edges in P1 ∪ P2 ∪ {(s, s2), (t1, t)} we buy infinite capacity resulting in 0 latency on
edges in P1 ∪ P2 and a latency of 1 on {(s, s2), (t1, t)}. For the edges in {(s, s1), (t2, t)} we spend the
budgets of 1 each. Then, splitting the flow evenly along these paths yields a Wardrop flow with routing cost
C(z,v) = 2 · ((1/2)2 + 1/2 · 1) = 3/2.
To show the second statement, let (v,z) be an optimal solution. We may assume that there is an (s, t)
path. We consider the following cases.
1. For exactly one i ∈ {1, 2}, all flow-carrying paths contain the edges (s, si) and (ti, t). For this case it
is easy to see that C(v,z) ≥ 2 since all 4 new edges have at least latency of 1 if used with 1 unit of
flow.
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2. There is a flow-carrying path P containing (s, s2) and (t1, t). In this case, the latency along this path
is at least 2, hence, since every flow-carrying path has the same latency, we obtain C(z,v) ≥ 2.
3. There is a flow-carrying path P containing (s, s1) and (t2, t). If all flow-carrying paths from s to t
contain (s, s1) and (t2, t), we obtain C(z,v) ≥ 2 using the budget constraints at {(s, s1), (t2, t)}.
Suppose there is another flow-carrying path Q containing (s, s1) and (t1, t). Then the latency on the
subpath Q[s1, t] must be at least 1 and, by the Wardrop conditions, the latency of P [s1, t] must be a
least one. If the entire demand uses edge (s, s1), the minimum possible latency on this edge is 1 and
the latency of P (and also Q) must be at least two, thus, we obtain C(z,v) ≥ 2. Suppose, there is a
flow-carrying path R containing the edge (s, s2). If R contains edge (t1, t), we are in case 2. Thus
we may assume that R contains edge (t2, t). Since we are in a “No” instance of 2DDP, the path R
must have one vertex with the path Q in common which implies that for R[s2, t] the latency is at least
1 and, hence, the latency of R is at least 2 giving C(v,z) ≥ 2.
4. The case that we have two flow-carrying (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) paths reduces to one of the cases 1., 2.
or 3. since we are in a “No” instance of 2DDP.
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